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IN THE S·UPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

R...\CHEL P. Ll~:NT and DILWORTH
STRASSER,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.

Case No.

7871
GEORGE W. KITCHENS, ALBION
L. KITCHENS, and MINNIE E.
KITCHENS,
Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The right of way involved in this case is situate on
the south side of 4th South Street between 4th and 5th
East Streets in Salt Lake City, Utah. It has a frontage.
of ten feet and extends South ninety-nine feet. It is
over and across the West ten feet of the North ninetynine feet of the appellant's property. Respondent's
property adjoins the right of way on the West.
It was the contention of the appellants during the
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trial of the case that the use of the right of way by the
respondents and their predecessors in interest was permissive. The respondents contended and the court found
that the respondents had used the right of way since
1920 openly, continuously, uninte-rruptedly, adversely
and under a claim of right. This issue is the crux of the
case.
ARGUMENT
The appellants first point relied upon for reversal
of the District Court is "That the court erred in finding
any prescriptive easement in favor of respondents," and
this point is divided into three subdivisions, namely:
"(A).
(B).
(C).

The applicable presumptions favor appellants.
The motion to dismiss the coun terclairn
should have been granted.
If appellants' e·vidence he believed, there
was no acquiescence by predecessors of
appellants."

We will discuss these matters in the order in which
they were discussed in the appellants' Brief.
Counsel for the respondents have no quarrel with
the authorities set out in the app~ellants' Brief at pages
22 to 39. The authorities there cited establish the rule
that in the absence of any evidence of an adverse use,
there is a presumption that the use was permissive. In
the opinion of this court, in Harkness v. Woodmansee,
7 Utah 227, 26 P. 291 at 293, this court stated the rule
in the following language:
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.. \\""here a person opens n \vny for the use of
his o"~n preinises, and other persons use it also
'Yithout causing damage, the presumption is, in
the absence of evidence to the contrary, that such
use by the latter 'Yas permissive, and not under
a claim of right..,
The same rule 'Yas announced by this court in Cache
Valley Banking Companyv. Cache Co·unty Poultry Growers ...-1ssociation, ____ (Utah) ----, 209 P. 2d 251 at 255 and

256:
.. If the evidence is sufficient to sustain the
finding that the usage 'vas adverse and with the
claim of right on the part of the claimant and
its predecessors and was not by permission of
the owner then the judgment must be affirmed
otherwise it must be reversed."
See also, Dahnken v. George Romney & Sons Company, 111 Utah 471, 184 P. 2d 211, and Zollinger v.
Frank, 110 Utah 514, 175 P. 2d 714.
The authorities referred to above and those cited
in the appellant's Brief establishes that presumptions
fade into oblivion in the face of direct positive evidence
of an adverse use.
The question then presents itself, was there any
evidence that the use of the right of way by the respondents and their predecessors in interest was adverse and
under claim of right.
George W. Kitchens, a witness for the respondents,
testified that he had been familiar with the use of the
right of way since 1920 (R. 15) and that the right of
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way had been used by the respondents and their predecessors in interest from 1920 to 1946 continually and
without any interruption and for every purpose (R.
27, 28). That in 1946, tenants of the appellants built
a gateway across the driveway, and that he went down
and moved the gate (R. 29).
Minnie Kitchens Packard testified that she was living with her mother at the time her mother purchased
the property adjoining the right of way on the West,
and continued to live with her for two years (R. 48, 49),
and that during that time, the driveway was used for
bringing in coal and wood and when people, friends
and relatives came in cars, they parked in the road
and that "it was used constantly as ours." (R. 4.9).
That in 1923, she moved to the southern part of Salt
Lake City but visited her mother all of the· time. That
during the past 30 years, she and her family had used
the driveway, and had put ashes on the driveway when
it became muddy and rutty (R. 52).
An Abstract of Title covering the respondents'
property was admitted in evidence as Defendants' Exhibit "1." Entry 30 of Exhibit "1" is an abstract of a
quit-claim deed from Carrie E. Weidner to Willie Ann
Kitchens dated May 15, 1936 and recorded in the Recorder's office for Salt Lake County, Utah, May 18,
1936 in Book 159 at page 75 and describing the right
of way in question (R. 13). (Res. Ex. ''1").
The Abstract of Title covering the appellants' property was also introduced in evidence· at least in so far
as Entry 16 thereof is concerned (R. 11). Entry 16
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of that . A.bstract i~ an abstraet of a \\1arranty Deed fron1
Carrie E. ,,~ eidner to Fred E. Weidner and Bessie
Evelyn Ferguson as tenants in common and not as joint
tenants, dated Decen1ber ~7, 1934, and recorded in the
Recorder's office for Salt Lake County, Utah December
27, 193-± in Book 1-±3, at page 144, describing the appellants property \vithout reference to the respondents'
right to use the right of \Yay in question.
While it is true that the Warranty Deed to Fred
E. Weidner and Bessie Evelyn Ferguson was made and
recorded in 1934 and the Deed of the right of way to
~Irs. Kitchens \Yas made and recorded in 1936, yet the
fact that Mrs. Weidner executed and delivered the
Quit-Claim Deed establishes beyond any doubt that the
use of the right of way for sixteen years prior to the
delivery of the Deed was under a claim of right, and
this. becomes even more impressive in the light of the
testimony of Fred E. Weidner, a witness for the appellants. Mr. Fred E. Weidner testified that his mother
had an interest in the property in question until the
time of her death, and that there was no consideration
other than a moral consideration for the execution and
delivery of the Deed (R. 93, 94).
As further proof that the use of the right of way
by the respondents was adverse and under claim of right,
the will of Carrie E. Weidner provided, "I also want
Mrs. W. A. Kitchens to have a ten foot by 99 foot driveway on the West side of my lot." (Res. Ex. "4"; R. 106).
The respondents do not base their claim to a prescriptive right of way either on the Quit-Claim Deed
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to Mrs. Kitchens nor upon the will of Mrs. Weidner but
the Quit-Claim Deed and the will establish beyond the
question of a doubt that the use of the right of way
by the respondents and their predecessors in interest
was adverse and under a claim of right.
There is, of course, some evidence introduced by
the appellants and referred to in their Brief, that the
use was permissive·. We respectfully submit that the
great preponderance of the evidence established the
fact that the use was open, continuous, without interruption, adverse and under claim of right, and therefore
the District Court properly resolved this issue in favor
of the respondents.
Subsection "B" of the appellants first point relied
upon for a reversal is that the Appellants Motion to
Dismiss the Counter-claim should have been granted.
c·ounsel argues that the motion should have been granted because the presumptions favor the appellants and
that the evidence of the appellants establishes that the
use was permiSSive.
We have heretofore pointed out that presumptions
have no application whatsoever in a case where there
is direct positive evidence of an adverse use. It may
well be that some of the evidence of the appellants was
that the use was permissive, but we have heretofore
pointed out that the respondents evidence which the
court believed was that the use was adverse and under
claim of· right.
Referring to subsection "C" to-wit: "If appellants'
evidence be believed, there was no acquiescence by
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predecessors of appellants,,, it appears to counsel for
the respondents that a eo1nplete answer to the appellants' argument in this part of their Brief is that the
evidence of the appellants "~as in direct conflict with
the evidence of the respondents and that the court found
the issue in favor of the respondents, which carries the
inference that the court did not believe the evidence
introduced for and on behalf of the appellants .
.A. case very similar to the case at bar was recently
before this court in the case of Buckley v. Cox, 1952, 247
P. (2) 277. In that case, the Plaintiff brought an action
to quiet title to a driveway. It was the contention of the
Plaintiff and he introduced evidence in support thereof
that the use of the driveway by the Defendant was permissive. The Defendant contended and introduced evidence in support of his contention that his use of the
driveway was adverse and under claim of right.
There was a direct conflict between the evidence of
the Plaintiff and the evidence of the Defendant and the
court resolved the issue in favor of the Plaintiff.
The Defendant appealled upon the ground that the
Plaintiff's evidence was insufficient to support the finding of the trial court. In its opinion, this court said:
"Under the criteria set out in Norback v.
Board of Directors, 84 Utah 506, 37 P. 2d, 339, this
action is one at law. Hence if there is any competent evidence in the record to support the
court's findings the judgment should not be disturbed. Brown v. Union Pac. R. Co., 76 Utah 475,
290 P. 759; Jenkins v. Stephens, 64 Utah 307, 231
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P. 112. This principle is well stated in Jensen v.
Gerrard, 85 Utah 481, 39 P. 2d, 1070, 1072:
"As this is a law action, the question is not
whether the evidence would have supported the
decision in favor of the appellants, but whether
the decision made by the trial court finds support
in the evidence. If there is competent credible evidence to support the findings made by the trial
court, then those findings should stand." ....
"The evidence as revealed by the record is
conflicting. It is sufficient to support a decision
for either party. The trial judge saw and heard
all the witnesses and viewed the exhibits. He
found that the use by defendant was permissive
and not adverse. Since competent evidence in the
record supports the court's finding and judgment, we may not disturbe the latter. S.ee cases
supra."

APPELLANT'S POINT No. 2
Counsel for the appellants complain that the driveway should be used only to the extent that the ownership and occupancy of the respondents property adjoining on the west requires, and in support of their contention, they referred to the testimony of Mr. G. W.
Kitchens that "he owns property adjoining 414 East
Fourth South to the west and then to the South, and that
he intends to operate all of the property as a motel,
intending to drive cars used for other portions of the
motel down the driveway and park them in the rear of
414 East Fourth South." (R. 40).
We would like to point out that the testimony of
one of the witnesses could not in any way alter or affect
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the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree
of the court and their Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
La\v and the Decree did not grant to the respondents the

right to use the drive\vay in connection with the use of
any property other than the property at 414 East F·ourth
South. Paragraph four of the Findings of Fact provides:

"±. That the Defendants are the owners of
an easen1ent consisting of a right of wa-y over
and across the said premises of the -Plaintiff
described in Finding No. 3," appellants property.
"The purposes for passing over the same with
or without horses, wagons, automobiles, trucks
and other vehicles and in any and all other
reasonable manner and for the ingress to and
egress from the premises of the Defendants above
described in Finding number two, which said
easement and right of way have been used by the
Defendants and their predecessors in interest
openly, adversely, continuously, uninterruptedly
and under claim of right for a period of more
than twenty-five years last past, and the same
is appurtenant to the said above described premises used by the Defendants as aforesaid." (R.
109).
The Decree of the District Court provides as follows:
"2. That the Defendants, George W. Kitchens, Albion L. Kitchens and Minnie E. Kitchens
are the owners of an easement and right of way
over and across that portion of the premises
of the Plaintiff above described for the purposes
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of passing over the same with or without wagons,
automobiles, trucks and other vehicles and in any
and all other reasonable manner and for ingress
to and egress from the premises of the Defendant hereinafter described, which easement and
right of way is described as follows:" (A description of the easement follows) (R. 112).
Paragraph three of the court's Decree describes
the property belonging to the respondents and adjoining the right of way on the west. The Decree provides
that the right of way shall be appurtenant to the Defendant's property and limits the use to the use and occupancy of respondents' property adjoining the right of
way on the west.
It will thus be seen that the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and Decree of the District court
limit the use of the right of way in exactly the manner
that the appellants desire and there is therefore, no need
for any complaint on that score by the appellants.

APPELLANT'S POINT No. 3
The appellants third point of error is that it would
be an enlargement of .the prescriptive right to give
the respondents the right to drive from the right of way
in question on to the respondents' lot in the rear of the
respondents' home.
We concede that the prescriptive right cannot be
enlarged if it thereby imposes a greater burden on the
servient estate. We contend also and the cases cited
by the appellants hold that the use may be enlarged

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11
if it does not in1pose a greater burden on the servient
estate. The rule is stated in 1+ Cyc. 1193 as follows:
~' . .-\.Iterations

""hich do not Inaterially increase
the servitude will not extinguish the right."
Prior to the time when the fence on the west side
of the right of 'Yay in question was torn down, it was
necessary for cars and trucks using the right of way for
delivery of various commodities to unload and then
either to back out of the driveway or drive onto the
appellants' rear lot and turn around. The evidence shows
that during the prescriptive period people came to
deliver all manner of things, visitors came to see them,
and all who lived in 414 over the prescriptive period
made use of the driveway. The fence was on the Kitchens property running north and south with a gate near
the coal shed. During the prescriptive period they drove
their cars into the driveway down to or near the gate,
left them parked in the driveway and went through the
gate into Kitchens lot. A concrete walk from the house
to the gate was there when Kitchens moved in (R. 59).
Kitchens always claimed the right to use the right of
way but they never claimed a right to park east of the
right of way on the Weidner property. At times they
wanted to get out of the driveway and so asked permission to park behind the Weidner property. That
was east of the driveway. The fence was on the Kitchens property. When the fence was taken down it did
not cast any additional burden on the Weidner property.
In fact it relieved the burden. When cars are driven
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1n and deliveries are made they do not have to park
the cars and trucks in the driveway as they had done
for more than the prescriptive period but they can drive
off the right of way on to the Kitchens property, turn
around and drive out. The W eidners never did have
anything to do with the fence on the west side of the
right of way. The use with the fence down will relieve
the burden on the servient estate.
It is of no concern of the appellants that Kitchens
took down his own fence. The Kitchens family could
have taken it down anytime and it would have made no
difference to the appellants, except to relieve the servient
tenement of some of its burden.
The appellants argue on page 45 of their Brief,
that one way in which the servient estate would be
burdened by permitting the respondents to drive from
the right of way on to the rear of their lot, was that
George Kitchens planned to operate a motel on the
corner and planned to use the right of way in question
in connection with the use of the entire corner. We have
heretofore pointed out that the Decree of the District
Court grants no such right or privilege to the respondents.
APPELLANT'S POINT No. 4
In support of the appellants' fourth point of errort
it is stated that the only question raised by a Motion
for a New Trial is "Whether the· Affidavit of Eloise
Bowden presented material evidence which might alter
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the result." \Ve find ourselves in complete disagree1nent
'vith this staten1ent of the la,v.
In order to entitle a party to a new trial upon the
grounds of newly discovered evidence, the evidence
must not be merely cumulative and where the case is
tried to the court without a jury, it n1ust appear that if
such evidence "~as produced at the trial of the case the
court's Findings would have been different. H eichm.er
v. Peterson, 75 Utah 107, 111, 283 P. 432. Larson v.
Ones£te, 21 lTtah 38, 59 P. 234.
Let us therefore, examine the record and see whether
the evidence which the appellants offered in support
of their motion for a new trial is cumulative.
The affidavit of Eloise Bowden filed in support of the
appellants' motion for a new trial states that she is the
daughter of Bessie Weidner F'erguson and that she lived
in the Weidner house from April, 1937 to the fall of
1939. That she was present when a conversation occurred
between :Jirs. Kitchens and her grandmother, Mrs. Weid... ner. That Mrs. Kitchens said to the affiant, "I am giving
your grandmother this dollar in front of you Eloise, so
that if anything ever comes up concerning the driveway,
you can say I paid for the use of it;" that on another
occasion just before Christmas in 1939, Mrs. Kitchens
gave the affiant one dollar and asked her to give it to
her grandmother in the hospital in payment of the agreement, that one dollar a year be paid for the use of the
right of way. That in April, 1937, the affiant and her
husband installed a telephone in that part of the Weidner house in which they lived and on several occasions
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Mrs. Kitchens brought over bread and puddings "to
pay for the driveway." That from April 1937 to the
tilne when the affiant moved in 1939, the driveway was
used by Mrs. Kitchens and her family only for making
delivery of coal, except when Mrs. Kitchens grandson
was home on furlough and when he asked for permission
to park his car on the Weidner property. The affiant's
husband gave him permission. That in the summer of
1924 the affiant lived with her grandparents and that
the driveway then was used only for making delivery
of coal. That in about the year 1933, after the death of
Mr. Weidner, Mrs. Weidner rented a part of the home
to a family with a little girl, and to accommodate the
family, a gate was put up across the driveway and that
the gate remained for at least six months.
The testimony of Eloise Bowden is all cumulative.
Mr. Fred Weidner, a witness for the appella:nts, testified as follows :

"Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Did you ever have any conversation with
any of the Kitchens people about the use of
that driveway~
Oh, indirectly.
When~

I called up Mrs. Kitchens one time and asked
if she would call my mother to the phone.
I said, "I hate to bother you."
She said, "Oh, don't think about that, you let
us use your driveway and that is in payment
of the telephone calls." (R. 86).

He also testified that his mother had an understanding with Mrs. Kitchens that she could use Mrs. Kitchens

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

15
phone and Mrs. Kitchens ""ould call her to the phone
for the use of the drive,vay ( R. 89).
The statement of the affiant that between April, 1937
and the time 'Yhen the affiant moved in 1939 that the
driV"e,Yay "~as used only for the delivery of coal, except
when Mrs. Kitchens' grandson was home on furlough, is
also cumulative. ~Ir. Fred E. Weidner so testified (R.
85). Her statement that in 1924 the driveway was used
only for the delivery of coal is also cumulative. Mr.
Fred E. " . .eidner so testified ( R. 96).
Her statement that in 1933 a gate was put across
the driveway and that it remained for at least six
months is cumulative, for both Mr. Weidner and Mrs.
Ferguson so testified (R. 85, 99).
We respectfully submit that the record establishes
beyond a doubt that the evidence offered in support of
the appellants motion for new trial was all cumulative
and therefore the motion was properly denied.
This court has repeatedly held that in order to entitle a person to a new trial upon the grounds of newly
discovered evidence, diligence must have been shown
to produce such evidence at the time of trial. Vandyke v.
Ogden Savings Bank, 48 Utah 606, 161 P. 50. Shields v.
Ekman, 67 Utah 474,248 P. 128.
There is not one single statement or allegation of
anyone in the record that diligence had been used to
uncover the testimony of Eloise Bowden and to present
it at the trial of the case. On the contrary, the record
leads one to the conclusion that if diligence had been
used, the testimony of Eloise Bowden would have been
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uncovered long before the time of the trial. Eloise
Bowden is the daughter of Bessie Weidner F·erguson,
and a granddaughter of Mrs. Weidner. It appears from
her affidavit that she lived at the Weidner residence in
1924 and from 1937 to 1939, and it appears further that
she had some knowledge of the installation of a gate
in 1933. Bessie Weidner Ferguson was a witness for
the appellants, and a simple inquiry directed to Mrs.
Ferguson would have uncovered the fact that her daughter, Eloise Bowden, had lived in the Weidner home
during the periods mentioned and had some knowledge
which had a bearing on the outcome of this case.
We respectfully submit that the newly discovered
evidence offered in support of the appellants' motion
for a new trial was cumulative; that it would have had
no bearing on the outcome of the trial and that the
record does not disclose that any diligence was used
to uncover the testimony of Eloise Bowden, but on
the contrary, the record discloses that if the slightest
diligence had been used, such testimony would have
been discovered.

CONCLUSION
We respectfully submit that the records show by
the great preponderance of evidence that the respondents and their predecessors in interest have used the
driveway in question openly, continuously, adversely,
uninterruptedly and under a claim of right since 1920
and by reason thereof, the respondents have acquired a
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prescriptive right to use said driveway within the limitations set out in the Decree of the District Court.
We further respectfully submit that since the testimony of Eloise Bowden was merely cumulative, and
since the appellants have not shown any diligence whatsoever in uncovering her testimony, the District Court
ruling on the appellants motion for a new trial should
be sustained.
Respectfully submitted,

w.

G. HOWELL

AND

GAYLEN S. YOUNG,
Attorneys for Respondents.
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